Raymond Aron's Big Three
May 14 '03
The Bottom Line A look at some thoughts by French political thinker Raymond Aron.
The Other Big Three: Technological Surprise, Organizing of Enthusiasm, and the Rise of Secular Religions
French political thinker Raymond Aron contributes three major contributors to the pool of thought dealing with the shaping of wars and conflicts that would develop throughout Europe in the post-1914 world. While Aron could point to countless aspects that all had some sort of influence on the times he chooses three to focus his attention on. These three aspects are the technological surprise, the organizing of enthusiasm, and the rise of secular religions.
Aron feels as though it is these three distinct yet different institutions that play the biggest part in shaping the post-1914 Europe. While he does not seem to favor one aspect over another, it does seem as though Aron feels as though one without the cohabitation of the other simply would not have had the same impact as the three working in conjunction with one another.
The first premise that Aron touches on is that the rise of the technological surprise had a profound impact upon the civilizations of Europe after World War I. He writes about the role that the technological surprise had on the times and emphasizes the importance of the rise of the technological surprise.
He writes, “I am prepared to say that the ‘locomotive’ of change, at that time, was technology that called for enthusiasm to be whipped up, that doomed to failure all attempts at conciliation, disregarded any appeal to traditional diplomatic wisdom, and helped spread a crusading spirit. Technology led to a peace that created the situation that started World War II.” (Aron 84) It is important to note the importance that Aron places on merely one aspect, that being the technological movement. Rather than simply say that the technology of the time was impressive, Aron offers his suggestion that it was technology that was the driving force behind the changes taking place at that time.
Aron also blames, technology in a way, for the negative aspects that he feels technology has brought to the realm of politics. The technological surprise, just as it is the driving force of change, can also be seen as the driving force of negative repercussions, or change for the worse. Aron blames technology for breaking down the notion of pacification and appeasement, for eliminating any hope to settle matters through diplomatic measures, and clearly, instilling within the people a fervent belief that through means of volatility and hostility coupled with technology goals could be achieved in a far quicker manner. It seems as though the technological surprise was that where most would have thought that an increase in technological innovation would have been for the better, in actuality things turned out worse than they were pre-technology.
Aron needed to define exactly what the technological surprise was in order to offer an antithetical viewpoint of what it offered. “It was the machine guns and cannons, improved but all in much larger numbers, that finished the job. The new weapons, such as planes and tanks for combat gradually changed the whole face of armies from 1917 on.” (Aron 81) Through rather tangible and specific changes in the actual military make up through technological advances, it is quite clear that Aron feels as though especially the military technological surprise was responsible for the shift in post-1914 Europe.
The technological surprise, in Aron’s opinion, also has a lot to do with the role that the United States played in post-1914 Europe. “The intervention of the United States, alone was unprecedented and marked a historical turning point, and the full significance of its role has become clear only in retrospect. And the main cause of its intervention was technological amplification of the war.” (Aron 82) Clearly, the vast improvements in technology surprised even one of the hegemonic powers of the time, the United States.
It is Aron’s assertion that the reason that the United States entered the fray of post-1914 Europe was because of the massive surprise of how quickly technology was being amplified. Perhaps Aron would go so far as to say that the reason the United States became involved in the European scene of post-1914 was simply based on the premise that the US was afraid of simply letting one European nation go after another with the backing of technology supporting it. If the United States was indeed scared by the amplification of the importance of technology, than the argument can be made that the Cold War that so many felt started after World War II in all actuality started after World War I.
The next point that Aron addresses deals with the organizing of enthusiasm. This point is not as concrete as the technological surprise because it deals with a lot of intangible and emotional characteristics rather than material things such as missiles and tanks. The way in which Aron defines this aspect is that the, “…organizing of enthusiasm is a phase in the mobilization of the civil population.” (Aron 85) While one might argue that the organizing of enthusiasm was just as prevalent in pre-1914 Europe, the vaster influence that it had after World War I was far more noteworthy.
When one is to think about the organizing of enthusiasm, one could almost substitute the word enthusiasm with the notion of the masses. The organizing of enthusiasm could be seen in Hitler Germany when the governmental propaganda instilled within the masses an enthusiasm that could not be detracted. Through the means of organizing the enthusiasm of a group of people, a leader could ultimately attain whatever goal it might be that they would be striving for.
To further expand upon the idea of organizing enthusiasm, Aron looks at what happened during World War II and how societal factors simply backed his point. “On both sides, people claimed to know in the name of what they were fighting for, but no one said what they were fighting for.” (Aron 85) This statement is fundamental to Aron’s argument that there was an organizing of enthusiasm taking place in Europe at the time. People were fighting fellow mankind in the name of an objective that they would rather not divulge. Yet, they were not at liberty to discuss why they were fighting? This seems rather farfetched. More likely, the people who took up arms for a cause against another cause did not likely do it under the banner of a cause for which they believed deeply in, but rather, for a reason they were unsure of. The organizing of enthusiasm wrapped people up so much that fighting was done for reasons unknown. It becomes more and more apparent that through the cunningness of certain leaders, people could become so enthused about a cause that they did not need to know much about it, but more importantly, just needed to support it.
Another instance in which Aron touches upon the subject of the organizing of enthusiasm is once again when dealing with war. Aron writes, “Once general war broke out, its immediate causes were inevitably forgotten and what was at stake no longer had anything to do with its origins.” (Aron 85) Similar to the previously discussed point, this statement by Aron also has something to do with the notion that in time of war the masses seem to not concern themselves with what they originally felt the war was supposed to be about, but rather, primarily focus on the outcome. Through the organizing of enthusiasm, the people no longer fight for a cause that they believe strongly in, but rather fight out of a hyper-enthusiasm for doing what they feel that they ought to do.
The other factor that Aron looks at deals with the issue of the rise of secular religions. The rise of secular religions is far different than the rise of a truly religious religion in the sense that there really is a false sense of moral supremacy to those who feel as though what they are doing is spreading the faith of one sort or another. Aron writes about some of these secular religions: “The religion of hyper-rationalism is succeeded by the religion of biological impulse. The contrast is seen more clearly in the realm of ideology. The Third Reich accords as much importance as socialism does to administrative and industrial rationalization.” Aron then goes on to talk about a leader of a secular religion when he writes, “But the man leading this religion to victory, the man whom this religion takes as its model, is not a man of reason, but a beast of prey, triumphant in the animal struggle for life.” Clearly, it is Aron’s belief that the rise of secular religions is definitely something that should be watched cautiously, due to the leaders of secular religions often times being men of no reason and bestial in nature.
But there must be something that the rise of secular religions does offer to the people, or else, they would not choose to support such a movement on a wide level. Aron writes, “At the same time, the secular religions do offer a substitute system of unification.” (Aron 190) Therefore, it can be argued that secular religions aid in the organizing of enthusiasm because the rise in secular religions brings about a unification of people that are all organized under one banner, whatever that may be.
The roles of the three discussed topics of the technological surprise, the organizing of enthusiasm, and the rise of secular religions all dramatically changed the way in which statesmanship would be practiced for years to come. Each of the three topics played off of the others in creating a way of governance that was far different than a pre-World War world offered. The three aspects that Aron writes about would forever shape the wars and conflicts that would arise in Europe for years to come.
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