A Few Final Thoughts on Preemption: Announcing the National Security Strategy Write/OffJun 24 '05 Write an essay on this topic.
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The Bottom Line This is part of a paper I wrote for my "Terrorism's Challenge To International Law" seminar here at TU Law School. For the full paper, e-mail me at noblueprints@hotmail.com.
The ultimate concept behind the move from deterrence to preemption among American strategic thinkers is that of the terrorist nuclear bomb. Throughout most of the post-World War II era it has been possible to distinguish terrorists from states. A state that gives or sells a nuclear weapon to people to who intend to use it on civilians, however, has definitely lost the right to any different treatment than they receive. A little over a year ago I raised a few eyebrows by asking at a discussion of war and peace here at the College of Law how the world order would change if the United States were to kill fifty million people. What I had in mind was that terrorists would set off a nuclear bomb here in the United States. Attacked in this unprecedented way, by a terrorist organization that recruited from multiple states, I believed the United States would throw all humanitarian and legal considerations to the four winds. It would decide to kill the maximum number of POTENTIAL MEMBERS of that organization and ensure that survivors in the targeted states lived on a level below that of sub-Saharan Africa, too concerned with basic survival to think about the geopolitics of the larger world. (In my romantic vision, they would eventually give up monotheism and forget there was a world at all beyond the sands, the ruins, and the vengeful gods who had smitten them.) It would show any other potential enemies what was waiting for them if they attacked: no more nation-building, only nation-erasing. To the extent the targeted states included members of OPEC, of course, we would find it very difficult to get petroleum; but after a nuclear explosion in the United States, mere economic disruption would be the least of our concerns! This vision is the reason I signed on to take this class, and the reason that I in general counsel restraint in the use of force. To kill is to play God. The more you kill, the less of a conscience you have and the more Godlike you are able to convince yourself you are. This metaphor would probably be rejected by members of the military, who are at least theoretically subject to being killed themselves (albeit by enemies whose firepower is orders of magnitude inferior to theirs); but it is quite apt for their civilian superiors who plot and strategize from a position of perfect safety. The guest presenter on that day stammered, "I really don't know what to say. . .The world would be supine." Eventually he asserted, "We just couldn't ever do that," or words to that effect. I offered, "Not without sacrificing who we are." It is to avoid situations like that that the present Administration and I along with it are willing to consider striking the enemy first. To kill fifty thousand is worth it if it saves the better part of fifty million. Two real problems exist: defining the enemy, and choosing the parameters of the strike. A state that disagrees with the United States on important matters and is willing to fight to protect its right to make its own decisions IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY THE ENEMY. A state whose leaders value the lives of their own people is a deter-able opponent, not an enemy. Even a violent political movement which has not yet crossed the Rubicon of killing Americans is not necessarily the enemy. Only those who have demonstrated an implacable commitment to killing Americans should really be considered the enemy. There are a few values in the world for which the United States should itself be implacable. Hegemony is not one of them. Since the Fourteen Points the United States has been committed in principle to the ideas of self-determination and the spread of democracy. The United States must carefully consider what the best way to make these ideas a reality is. The end of the Cold War demonstrated that although having effective armed forces is indispensable to the promotion of democracy, using them is not the only way to accomplish that end. An aggressive stance emboldens those few who are truly our enemies, making it harder for progressive thinking in their countries to win the masses over as their nationalism and piety surge reflexively to meet us. Had the U. S. been so superior in conventional arms that the Russians seriously believed we would charge into Eastern Europe, would they ever have chosen Gorbachev to lead them? Or would they now be a larger, more dangerous (and more pathetic) version of North Korea? We have in a sense been a victim of the success of our ideas. We have so many friends now that to stand up for all of them is inevitably to step on someone's toes. This phenomenon has also been referred to as "imperial overreach." The United States has strongly supported Israel, but has not directly intervened in its wars with our own troops. In general we should only do that if the outcome is in doubt. In what Thomas Friedman has referred to as the Islamic world's civil war, the outcome is in doubt and we are intervening with our own troops, but we should not do so everywhere. Some self-confidence must be inculcated in Islamic progressives and some room left for them to operate. When speaking of striking first, it is only common sense that the force you use is proportional to the force that can be used on you in retaliation. The larger an enemy state (or movement), therefore, the larger the initial attack must be. With exceptionally rational opponents it may be possible to set parameters for an exchange of force that does not escalate to total war, or even to rule out retaliation completely, as Webster did after the "Caroline" incident. But if an opponent is that rational it probably isn't necessary to attack his assets in the first place. The key is to find a way to attack the assets of enemies operating on his territory. As at the beginning of the section, we face the problem of distinguishing terrorists from states. This problem is in most cases to be solved, not pushed aside.  |
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