JAMES23's Full Review: Michael Frisconalti - Friendly Fire: The Untold St...
In March 2002 Alpha Company of the Third Battalion Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry were conducting offensive operations against Taliban and Al Queda forces in the mountainous region of South West Afghanistan in and around a feature known as “the whale.” These actions part of Operation Harpoon were being conducted in support of and with elements of the 10th Mountain Division of the United States Army.
A Forward Air Controller operating with 10th Mountain noticed what appeared to be Taliban or Al Queda forces on a nearby feature and presuming that they were a threat to friendly troops called in an air strike by on call F-16 fighter bombers on this “enemy” position.
In a nearby tactical headquarters a Canadian liaison officer attached to the Americans and following the battle heard the air strike request and quickly checked the coordinates. A look of sheer horror came over his face as he frantically called off the impending strike with moments to spare. A senior American officer in the headquarters checked on the Canadian’s actions and immediately came to the same conclusions. The coordinates for the air strike were not on an enemy force but on Alpha Company 3 PPLCI. The senior American’s comments summed it up, “We just came close to killing a whole bunch of Canadians there.” This narrowly averted incident was a chilling prelude to a tragedy a month later.
Almost immediately after the tragedy of September 11, 2001 the American military dispatched air and ground forces to Afghanistan to help oust the Taliban who had allowed Al Queda to train and shelter in that country. Other allied nations also agreed to contribute military forces, including Canada.
The Canadian contribution included naval and air transport assets already in the region operating in the Persian Gulf and some Special Forces. The main force though was a battalion sized battle group formed around the Third Battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (3PPLCI). This Regular Force unit based in Western Canada was well trained in mountain and airmobile operations and suited to the task at hand.
Initially on arrival in Afghanistan in February 2002 the 3PPCLI Battle Group’s main role was providing security for the Khandahar Airbase freeing up US forces for a more active role in combating the Taliban and Al Queda in the region. Within a month though the Canadians began to take a more active role in the war, first as small units attached to larger US formations and then the Battle Group as a whole.
On April 17, 2002 A (Parachute) Company of 3PPCLI was preparing to conduct a training exercise at Tarnak Farms a former Al Queda training site near the Khandahar airbase complex. The company would soon commence airmobile operations in the nearby mountains and in preparation for that it was decided to conduct night time live fire training of several of the section and platoon weapons.
As dusk fell the members of A Company moved to Tarnak Farms and set up their ranges. Weapons were checked and safety briefings conducted. After all this was completed the sections and platoons moved up to the firing points and commenced live fire training with their personal weapons, C9 Light Machine Guns, C6 General Purpose Machine Guns and 84 mm Carl Gustaff anti tank recoilless rifles. The training continued past midnight and into the early hours of April 18, 2002.
Unknown to the Canadian Paratroopers a flight of two F-16 fighter bombers was in the region and returning to their base after a ten hour uneventful patrol over Afghanistan. The planes were piloted by Major William Umbach who was the flight leader and Major Harry Schmidt both members of the Illinois Air National Guard.
Flying in the vicinity of Tarnak at 15,000 feet they saw the weapons flashes and tracers from the live fire exercise and moved in to investigate. The flight contacted their airborne controller of the possibility that the fire they could see on the ground was enemy forces and/or that friendly ground troops were in need of air support.
Seeing the flashes of ground fire and under the impression that Umbach was under attack, Schmidt asked flight control permission to fire his 20 mm cannons, to which flight control replied "hold fire." Four seconds later, Schmidt said he was "rolling in, in self defense." He dropped a 250 lilo laser-guided bomb 35 seconds later.
The bomb impacted in the middle of a section of Canadian paratroopers. When the smoke and blast cleared, four were dead and eight more seriously wounded. Seconds later the pilots received the word form the Air controller that there were friendlies in the region.
Unaware of the damage they had done Umbach and Schmidt returned to their base where they learned thay had bombed allied coalition troops. Back at Tarnak an operation was quickly undertaken to evacuate the wounded and secure the area both to enable recovey of the remains and to preserve evidence for any investigation.
There were two separate investigations conducted one each by the Canadian and American military. All factors were considered and eventually charges of negligent manslaughter (4 counts) and aggrevated assault (8 counts) were laid against both pilots ironically on September 11, 2002. The lengthy court proceedings that followed finally culminated in an Article 32 hearing held at Barksdale Airforce base in Lousiana on July 6, 2004.
Michael Friscotti is a reporter who covered the Tarnak Farms friendly fire incident for the National Post. Friendly Fire: The Untold Story of the US Bombing That Killed Four Canadian Soldiers in Afghanistan is his comprehensive account of the events of the tragedy from the bombing through to the final resolution in a court room near Baton Rouge.
Frisconti starts with the preparation for the live fire shoot and the activities that happened that night including all the appropriate safety procedures that were in place. There is also an introduction to the two pilots, both highly experienced individuals, Schmidt a graduate of the United States Navy’s Fighter Weapons (Top Gun) School, and the preperation they went through for their mission.
Using transcripts of radio conversations made available he recounts the actions of the two pilots up to and after the decision was made to drop the bomb. He then covers the initial reactions both at the USAF airbase where the pilots land and are informed of the consequences of their actions, and at the Khandahar base and the Canadian’s reaction to the tragedy. This is followed by a detailed account of both boards of inquiry, their make up, their findings and the results of those findings.
Frisconti also takes us into the homes of the survivors, the wounded paratroopers, their comrades and the families of the deceased and how they all deal with this. Their emotions and responses, grief, guilt, anger, and in one case greed are all presented in a frank yet non judgmental manner.
The story quickly made headlines in both Canada and the United States with elements on both sides of the border laying and trying to shift responsibility and blame, as more and more details were uncovered. National feelings ran high and the story soon shifts from the main stream media to the Internet blogs, forums and chat rooms where emotions begin to replace facts.
At one point the announcement to award all four of the deceased, but not the eight wounded, with the Bronze Star is met with derision by many Canadians including one of the next of kin. Eventually over 30 Bronze Star medals are awarded for their actions in Afghanistan to the PPCLI Battle Group including the four deceased soldiers.
Frisconti read and reviewed literally thousands of documents and interviewed hundreds of persons both while covering the story initially and later as he began to research the book. Throughout it he tries to maintain a professional and detached manner. All the participants, wounded survivors, investigators and next of kin are treated fairly and without bias. One however does not present a sympathetic case to the reader.
Of the two pilots Major Umbach comes across as sincere and truly repentant. Almost immediately on being advised the flight he was in charge of had bombed allied troops and caused casualties he demonstrated remorse and accepted responsibility for the actions. He made a formal and sincere apology to the next of kin. The charges against him were eventually dismissed, and he received a formal letter of reprimand and was allowed to retire from the United States Air Force.
Major Harry Schmidt’s attitude, as Frisconti ably demonstrates, was the exact opposite. Rather than being contrite and remorseful, Schmidt comes across as arrogant and petulant, refusing at any time to take any responsibility for the bomb he dropped.
After initially being charged Schmidt begins to mount his at times very public defence. Even after the charges against him are reduced to dereliction of duty and he is offered the opportunity to plead guilty and receive non judicial punishment, he demands a court martial. He then assembles a defence team of military and civilian lawyers even using friends and neighbours to help him raise funds.
Schmidt’s defensive strategy continues to change as each of his arguments is defeated. At no time does he ever argue that he did not drop the bomb but there are always mitigating circumstances and therefore he is not to blame.
First is the argument that they thought they being fired upon by Taliban insurgents, and that he feared for both Umbrach’s and his life. Expert evidence quickly dismisses this claim and Schmidt is unable to explain how small arms fire on the ground 15,000 feet below a jet traveling at supersonic speeds, he shifts strategies.
Faulty intelligence briefings and mistaking the Canadian’s fire for enemy surface to air missiles is tried. Added to this is the fact no one told Schmidt in his briefing that the Canadian’s were training there at that time. This is ironic as Friosconti points out that one of Schmidt’s assignments in his squadron was to ensure all pilots were fully briefed and up to date on enemy capabilities and location of friendly forces. When presented with this he points out that the coalition briefings were too long and no one was fully reading them.
He also blamed faulty communications with the airborne controllers and that he misunderstood the orders to not fire that he was given. The radio logs quickly discount this defence.
Next up is the “go pill” defence where Schmidt claimed all pilots were being “forced” to use amphetamines due to the lengthy duration and frequency of their missions.
The most pathetic part of his defence strategy is when he attempts top shift blame to the victims. Schmidt claims that the Canadians shouldn’t have there in the first place “because no one should be training in a war zone. He compound this by pointing out the Canadians were not using authorized American training methods including how their night fire range should have been marked. The overall America commander at Khandahar had approved both the training and the safety measures put in place by the Canadians. Incidentally all of this information was including in the “too long” briefing packages.
Schmidt compounds this defence by implying that he is the victim and being set up as a public scapegoat to appease an ally in the War on Terror, He infers that had it been American troops bombed and killed the whole incident would have been covered up.
Much is made of Schmidt’s character during the proceedings, including the fact that he had publicly stated that he and /or his squadron desperately needed a “kill” as their tour of duty in South West Asia was fast approaching an end. There was also resentment that he the “Top Gun” pilot was flying wingman to the lesser experienced Umbach and that he took over command of the mission by force of personality.
Fighter pilots testified both for and against Schmidt, some reluctantly supporting his actions, many others doing their best to distance themselves from both the incident and the individual.
In the end it was all for naught. Schmidt could not disprove the facts of the case. He could not prove that he nor his fellow pilot were in danger, and that he had deliberately disobeyed an order which cost the lives of four allied soldiers.
After negotiations between his lawyers and the US Government attorneys, Schmidt was allowed to reverse his demand for a public court martial and accept non judgmental punishment. On June 24, 2004 he was found guilty of the charge of dereliction of duty, given a severe reprimand, stripped of flight status and fined $5,700.00.
Lt. General Carlson issued a scathing reprimand to Schmidt accusing him of “flagrantly disregarding a direct order” and "exercised a total lack of basic flight discipline", and "blatantly ignored the applicable rules of engagment.” He also summed up Schmidt’s charater and actions as “arrogant” and “shameful” and called into question Schmidt’s “integrity” and “honesty.”
Ever perceiving himself the victim, Major Schmidt immedialtey launched an appeal of the verdict and punishment. In June 2006 he also launched a civil law suit against the United States Airforce for defamation of character and violation of his prvacy rights as the text of the letter of reprimand was released to the public.
Frisconti’s account of the Tarnak Farms friendly fire incident ends with the Article 32 hearing in Lousiana in July more than two years after that fateful night of April 17-18, 2002. He does however briefly cover what happened to many of the main participants, the wounde, the other soldiers present and the next of kin of the fallen, and hoipe they continued to cope with the events, of failed to.
As a formally trained and award winning journalist, Frisconti writing style is clear and concise and despite some aspects of the subject matter Friendly Fire: The Untold Story of the Us Bombing That Killed Four Canadian Soldiers in Afghanistan is a fairly easy to read volume. Photographs, maps and diagrams also assist in following the narrative.
In June 2003, six months after their arrival in Afghanistan, the 700 odd members of 3PPCLI Battle group returned to Canada. The then Liberal government of Canada was unable to extend the mission or offer replacement troops, due to the neglect and cost cutting measures that they had imposed on the Canadian Forces.
Ironically Canadian troops would be back in Afghanistan in less than a year and in greater numbers. That same Government looking for a way out of committing troops to the American invasion of Iraq, offered 2,000 troops to a NATO sponsored stabilization force in Afghanistan. More than four years later Canadian troops are still in that country. The initial mission was extended and expanded on by successive Governments and now Canadian’s including some most likely members of the initial Battle Group deployed in 2002 are once again in the Taliban controlled south western region of the country, assisting with reconstruction efforts and actively combating the Taliban and Al Queda.
The cost has been high. To date 27 Canadian soldiers and one diplomat have been killed. They have died in combat, been killed by IEDs (improvised explosive devices) and suicide bombers and even in tragic accidents including those who lost their lives at Tarnak. The number of injured and wounded has also climbed. The Canadian public has now become used to the ever increasing solemn ramp ceremonies as the remains of their fallen sons and daughters are returned home.
In their six month tour in Afghanistan, 3PPCLI repeatedly engaged the enemy in difficult conditions and dangerous circumstances. They did so in a professional manner that saw them receive official praise and commendation form their allies. In all that time the only serious casualties suffered by the 700 odd members of the Battle Group were those incurred that fateful night. That is the yet another tragedy.
Full text of the Reprimend issued to Major H. Schmidt USAF by Lt General Carlson USAF
"You are hereby reprimanded. You flagrantly disregarded a direct order from the controlling agency, exercised a total lack of basic flight discipline over your aircraft, and blatantly ignored the applicable rules of engagement and special instructions. Your wilful misconduct directly caused the most egregious consequences imaginable, the deaths of four coalition soldiers and injury to eight others. The victims of your callous misbehaviour were from one of our staunch allies in Operation Enduring Freedom and were your comrades-in-arms.
"You acted shamefully on 17 April 2002 over Tarnak Farms, Afghanistan, exhibiting arrogance and a lack of flight discipline. When your flight lead warned you to "make sure it's not friendlies" and the Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft controller directed you to "stand by" and later to "hold fire," you should have marked the location with your targeting pod. Thereafter, if you believed, as you stated, you and your leader were threatened, you should have taken a series of evasive actions and remained at a safe distance to await further instructions from AWACS. Instead, you closed on the target and blatantly disobeyed the direction to "hold fire." Your failure to follow that order is inexcusable. I do not believe you acted in defence of Maj. Umbach or yourself. Your actions indicate that you used your self-defence declaration as a pretext to strike a target, which you rashly decided was an enemy firing position, and about which you had exhausted your patience in waiting for clearance from the Combined Air Operations Center to engage. You used the inherent right of self-defence as an excuse to wage your own war.
"In your personal presentation before me on 1 July 2004, I was astounded that you portrayed yourself as a victim of the disciplinary process without expressing heartfelt remorse over the deaths and injuries you caused to the members of the Canadian Forces. In fact, you were obviously angry that the United States Air Force had dared to question your actions during the 17 April 2002 tragedy. Far from providing any defence for your actions, the written materials you presented to me at the hearing only served to illustrate the degree to which you lacked flight discipline as a wingman of COFFEE Flight on 17 April 2002.
"Through your arrogance, you undermined one of the most sophisticated weapons systems in the world, consisting of the Combined Air Operations Center, the Airborne Warning and Control System, and highly disciplined pilots, all of whom must work together in an integrated fashion to achieve combat goals. The United States Air Force is a major contributor to military victories over our nation's enemies because our pilots possess superior flight discipline. However, your actions on the night of 17 April 2002 demonstrate an astonishing lack of flight discipline. You were blessed with an aptitude for aviation, your nation provided you the best aviation training on the planet, and you acquired combat expertise in previous armed conflicts. However, by your gross poor judgment, you ignored your training and your duty to exercise flight discipline, and the result was tragic. I have no faith in your abilities to perform in a combat environment.
"I am concerned about more than your poor airmanship; I am also greatly concerned about your officership and judgment. Our Air Force core values stress "integrity first." Following the engagement in question, you lied about the reasons why you engaged the target after you were directed to hold fire and then you sought to blame others. You had the right to remain silent, but not the right to lie. In short, the final casualty of the engagement over Kandahar on 17 April 2002 was your integrity."
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