Can one book explain how political power in Washington, D.C. really works? Hedrick Smith is determined to try. It says at the back of the book that he was the Washington bureau chief for the New York Times for almost a decade (and has written other books on political matters, gotten the occasional Pulitzer Prize, etc.), so we may reasonably hope that he understands the rules of the game as well as any journalist can. I was not a total political ignoramus before I first read this book a few years ago, but I found it very enlightening indeed. Smith naturally stresses the importance of image and public perception, especially in the last few decades of the 20th Century when TV cameras were giving the public a closer look at all sorts of things, but he goes a lot farther than just saying the important thing is to look as good as possible when you give a press conference.

Lest you worry, let me assure you that if he has an ax to grind concerning the Republican versus Democratic rivalry in American politics, he keeps it well hidden. At no time does he refer to the leaders of either party in such a way as to indicate he worships the very ground they walk upon. It is true that many of the stories he tells to illustrate his points deal with the behavior of Ronald Reagan and his trusted aides and Cabinet members and Congressional allies during the 1980s, but that is for the very simple reason that the book was first published in 1988 when Reagan had been president for almost eight years, and stories about how he had handled the job were going to ring more bells with an American audience's memories than stories about Democratic presidents of days long past (and we get some of those too - Reagan just gets more mentions, I'd say). And if I were Reagan, I certainly wouldn't feel this book had been written to flatter me. Smith stresses the point that Reagan had some very gifted public relations experts on his staff, but he also dwells on a fair number of political blunders (and occasional blatant lies) that came back to haunt the Reagan administration as time went by.

To give a sample of Smith's way of analyzing a complex issue from several sides, let me paraphrase his comments on the scourge of leaks, which cause supposedly-confidential information about government policies and proposals to be broadcast to the world via the media. After reading it, I began to understand why there are so many leaks in D.C. and why we are not likely to ever get rid of them.

The goodwill leak: Giving juicy tidbits to certain reporters in order to make them your friends for the future.

The ego leak: Bragging about something secret to a reporter so as to impress him (and yourself) with how important you are, to have access to such exciting information!

The trial-balloon leak: Deliberately leaking a proposed idea to the press so the administration can find out whether or not the public explodes in fury at the very idea of doing such-and-such. If they do, you can deny the whole thing as a silly rumor and cross it off your list of things you intended to do in the near future.

The whistle-blower leak: A government employee wanting to call public attention to something he views as disgustingly illegal, immoral, wasteful of money, et cetera.

The policy leak: Leaking a piece of information (or pure rumor) meant to either increase or decrease the public support for a certain policy, depending upon which side you're on in this particular battle.

The brag leak: Leaking the details of your own achievements in behind-the-scenes negotiations, such as how a certain big policy decision was really made, to make yourself (or your boss, if he's too modest to leak this himself) look very influential and heroic.

The inoculation leak: Giving the public an unofficial taste, in advance, of bad news that is bound to hit a peak and reach their attention anyway sometime in the near future, so they won't be totally shocked when the official announcement comes out later.

The shortcut leak: Trying to get the president's attention focused on a certain problem by making sure you leak it to someone who can and will put it on the front page of one of the big newspapers, where the President is bound to see it. (The author claims our Ambassador to South Vietnam used him for this purpose for awhile during the war, because the Ambassador was convinced that the State Department wasn't passing any of his reports and suggestions on to the Oval Office.)

The preemptive leak: Settling a heated argument over whether or not to make certain sensitive information public knowledge, by simply leaking it on your own initiative after the meeting breaks up, thereby avoiding the need to waste any time on future arguments on this particular decision.

I believe that makes nine possible motivations for a government official who is thinking of leaking something to the press. (And it doesn't even include the possibility of a high official getting stinking drunk at a party and letting something slip unintentionally, although I believe that truly accidental leaks, drunken or otherwise, have been known to happen.) It's a wonder that anybody fails to leak things, given so much temptation.

I summarized the Leak Categories because that was a heck of a lot easier than summarizing seven hundred pages of commentary, and gives you a taste for what Hedrick Smith is trying to do here. As I said above, his own political opinions (whatever they may be) are carefully kept out of sight. Instead, he tries to establish some general principles for political success by analyzing what various important American politicians of the late twentieth century have tried to do, and how they attacked the problem, and how far they actually got and why. For instance, on the leak issue, he comments that the newly inaugurated President Reagan was truly shocked to discover that if he made an offhand comment in a Cabinet meeting concerning his feelings on a certain issue, he would probably be quoted in the Washington Post the following day. When he was Governor of California, his "private" comments had generally remained private, but in Washington everyone seemed to be using a whole new rulebook. A result of this was that Reagan became less willing to speak his mind in Cabinet meetings, now that he knew darn well that someone in attendance was ready, willing, and able to repeat everything to a journalist at the first possible opportunity. That must have been nice for the Cabinet members. Imagine speaking for ten minutes to brief the President on a nasty situation that had arisen in your area of responsibility, and just having him nod at the end and say, "Thank you, Joe," without giving you any clear indication of what he intended to do about it, if anything. (Another result was that Reagan and his cronies tried to find ways to crack down harder on unauthorized leaks within the administration, but didn't get very far.)

If I were likely to become president of the USA anytime soon, I'd buy a few hundred copies of this book, hand them out to everyone who was on my staff or to whom I intended to offer a high-level job (Cabinet, for instance) and insist they read it. Of course, reading one book won't turn a person into an archangel who can do no wrong, but it wouldn't hurt them to read Smith's perspective on the ebb and flow of political power, and at least some of them would probably benefit from the experience. Wonder if George W. has ever looked it over?

Recommended: Yes